This paper studies social optima and Nash games for mean field linear quadratic control systems, where subsystems are coupled via dynamics and individual costs. For the social control problem, we first obtain a set of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDE) from variational analysis, and construct a feedback-type control by decoupling the FBSDE. By using solutions of two Riccati equations, we design a set of decentralized control laws, which is further proved to be asymptotically social optimal. Two equivalent conditions are given for uniform stabilization of the systems in different cases. For the game problem, we first design a set of decentralized control from variational analysis, and then show that such set of decentralized control constitute an asymptotic Nash equilibrium by exploiting the stabilizing solution of a nonsymmetric Riccati equation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mean field games have drawn increasing attention in many fields including system control, applied mathematics and economics [7] , [8] , [12] . The mean field game involves a very large (e-mail: hszhang@sdu.edu.cn) population of small interacting players with the feature that while the influence of each one is negligible, the impact of the overall population is significant. By combining mean field approximations and individual's best response, the dimensionality difficulty is overcome. Mean field games and control have found wide applications, including smart grids [27] , [10] , finance, economics [13] , [9] , [32] , and social sciences [5] , etc.
By now, mean field games have been intensively studied in the LQ (linear-quadratic) framework [18] , [19] , [25] , [33] , [6] , [29] . Huang et al. developed the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) based on the fixed-point method and designed an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for mean field LQ games with discount costs by the NCE approach [18] , [19] . The NCE approach was then applied to the cases with long run average costs [25] and with Markov jump parameters [33] , respectively.
Bensoussan et al. employed the adjoint equation approach and the fixed-point theorem to obtain a sufficient condition for the unique existence of the equilibrium strategy over a finite horizon [6] . For other aspects of mean field games, readers are referred to [21] , [23] , [39] , [11] for nonlinear mean field games, [37] for oblivious equilibrium in dynamic games, [17] , [34] , [35] for mean field games with major players, [16] , [29] for robust mean field games.
Besides noncooperative games, social optima in mean field models have also attracted much interest. The social optimum control refers to that all the players cooperate to optimize the common social cost-the sum of individual costs, which is usually regarded as a type of team decision problem [30] , [14] . Huang et al. considered social optima in mean field LQ control, and provided an asymptotic team-optimal solution [20] . Wang and Zhang [36] investigated a mean field social optimal problem where the Markov jump parameter appears as a common source of randomness. For further literature, see [22] for social optima in mixed games, [3] for team-optimal control with finite population and partial information.
Most previous results on mean field games and control were given by virtue of the fixed-point analysis. However, the fixed-point method is sometimes conservative, particularly for general systems. In this paper, we break away from the fixed-point method and solve the problem by tackling forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDE). In recent years, some substantial progress for the optimal LQ control has been made by solving the FBSDE. See [40] , [42] , [43] , [31] for details. This paper investigates social optima and Nash games for linear quadratic mean field systems, where subsystems (agents) are coupled via dynamics and individual costs. For the finite-horizon social control problem, we first obtain a set of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDE) by examining the variation of the social cost, and give a centralized feedback-type control laws by decoupling the FBSDE. With mean field approximations, we design a set of decentralized control laws, which is further shown to have asymptotic social optimality. For the infinite-horizon case, we design a set of decentralized control laws by using solutions of two Riccati equations, which is shown to be asymptotically social optimal. Some equivalent conditions are further given for uniform stabilization of the multiagent systems when the state weight Q is semi-positive definite or only symmetric. For the problem of mean field games, we first design a set of decentralized control by variational analysis, whose control gain satisfies a nonsymmetric Riccati equation. With the help of the stabilizing solution of the nonsymmetric Riccati equation, we show that the set of decentralized control laws is an asymptotic Nash equilibrium. It is verified that the proposed decentralized control laws are equivalent representation of the feedback strategies in previous works of mean field control and games. Finally, some numerical examples are given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed control laws.
The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows.
(i) For the social control problem, we first obtain necessary and sufficient existence conditions of finite-horizon centralized optimal control by variational analysis, and then design a feedbacktype decentralized control by tackling FBSDE with mean field approximations.
(ii) In the case Q ≥ 0, the necessary and sufficient conditions are given for uniform stabilization of the systems with the help of the system's observability and detectability.
(iii) In the case that Q is only symmetric, the necessary and sufficient conditions are given for uniform stabilization of the systems using the Hamiltonian matrices.
(iv) For the game problem, we show that the decentralized control laws constitute an ε-Nash equilibrium by exploiting the stabilizing solution of a nonsymmetric Riccati equation.
(v) It is under nonconservative assumptions that we obtain the asymptotically optimal decentralized control, and such control laws are shown to be equivalent to the feedback strategies given by the fixed-point method in previous works [19] , [20] .
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section II, the socially optimal control problem is investigated. We first construct asymptotically optimal decentralized control laws by tackling FBSDE for the finite-horizon case, then design asymptotically optimal control for the infinitehorizon case and further give two equivalent conditions of uniform stabilization for different cases. In Section III, we design a decentralized ε-Nash equilibrium for the finite-horizon and infinite-horizon cases, respectively. The proposed decentralized control laws are compared with April 17, 2019 DRAFT JOURNAL OF L A T E X CLASS FILES 4 the feedback strategies of previous works in Section IV. In Section V, some numerical examples are given to show the effectiveness of the proposed control laws. Section VI concludes the paper.
The following notation will be used throughout this paper. · denotes the Euclidean vector norm or matrix spectral norm. For a vector z and a matrix Q, z 2 Q = z T Qz, and Q > 0 (Q ≥ 0) means that Q is positive definite (semi-positive definite). For two vectors x, y, x, y =
is the space of all R n -valued continuous functions defined on [0, T ], and
For two sequences {a n , n = 0, 1, · · · } and {b n , n = 0, 1, · · · }, a n = O(b n ) denotes that lim sup n→∞ |a n /b n | ≤ C, and a n = o(b n ) denotes lim sup n→∞ |a n /b n | = 0. For convenience of presentation, we use C, C 1 , C 2 , · · · to denote generic positive constants, which may vary from place to place.
II. MEAN FIELD LQ SOCIAL CONTROL
Consider a large population systems with N agents. Agent i evolves by the following stochastic differential equation:
where x i ∈ R n and u i ∈ R r are the state and input of the ith agent.
Brownian motions on a complete filtered probability space (Ω, F , {F t } 0≤t≤T , P). The cost function of agent i is given by
where Q, R are symmetric matrices with appropriate dimensions, and R > 0. Denote u = {u 1 , . . . , u i , . . . , u N }. The decentralized control set is given by
For comparison, define the centralized control sets as
and
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In this section, we mainly study the following problem.
(PS). Seek a set of decentralized control laws to optimize social cost for the system (1)- (2), i.e., inf u i ∈U d,i J soc , where
.., N are mutually independent and have the same mathematical expectation.
.., N} and {W i , i = 1, ..., N} are independent of each other.
A. The finite-horizon problem
For the convenience of design, we first consider the following finite-horizon problem.
where
We first give an equivalent condition for the convexity of Problem (P1). 
where y (N ) = N j=1 y j /N and y i satisfies
Proof. Let x i andx i be the state processes of agent i with the control v andv, respectively.
Take any λ 1 ∈ [0, 1] and let λ 2 = 1 − λ 1 . Then
Denote u = v −v, and y i = x i −x i . Thus, y i satisfies (4) . By the definition of the convexity, the lemma follows.
April 17, 2019 DRAFT By examining the variation of J F soc , we obtain the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of centralized optimal control of (P1). Theorem 2.1: Suppose R > 0. Then (P1) has a set of optimal control laws if and only if Problem (P1) is convex in u and the following equation system admits a set of solutions
, and furthermore the optimal control is given
From (3), we haveJ
, and
Note that
From (7), one can obtain that
From (8) 
Thus, we have the following optimality system:
. This implies that the equation systems (5) admits a solution
thenǔ is a minimizer to Problem (P1).
April 17, 2019 DRAFT It follows from (5) that
Let
Then by (5), (11) and Itô's formula,
This implies that β
Theorem 2.2: Assume that A1) holds and Q ≥ 0. Then Problem (P1) has an optimal controľ
where P, K and s are determined by (12)- (14).
Proof. Denote Π = P + K. Then from (13) and (14), Π satisfies
. Note that Q ≥ 0 and R > 0. By [2] , [41] , (12) and (15) admit unique solutions P ≥ 0 and Π ≥ 0, respectively, which implies that (13) and (14) have unique April 17, 2019 DRAFT solutions K and s, respectively. Then by [26] , [42] , the FBSDE (5) admits a unique solution.
By Theorem 2.1, Problem (P1) has an optimal control given byǔ
where P, K and s are determined by (12)- (14) .
As an approximation to x (N ) in (11), we obtain
Then, by Theorem 2.2, the decentralized control law for agent i may be taken aŝ
where P, K, and s are determined by (12)- (14), andx andx i satisfy (16) and
Remark 2.1: In previous works [20] , [36] , the mean field term x (N ) in cost functions given by (17) has asymptotic social optimality, i.e.,
Proof. See Appendix A.
B. The infinite-horizon problem
Based on the analysis in Section II-A, we may design the following decentralized control laws for Problem (PS):
where P and Π are determined by
and s,x ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R n ) are determined by
Here the existence conditions of P, Π, s andx need to be investigated further.
We introduce some assumptions:
I, B) is stabilizable, and
Assumptions A2) and A3) are basic in the study of the LQ optimal control problem. We will
show that under some conditions, A2) is also necessary for uniform stabilization of multiagent systems. In many cases, A3) may be weakened to the following assumption.
Lemma 2.1: Under A2)-A3), (20) and (21) admit unique solutions P > 0, Π > 0, respectively, and (22)- (23) admits a set of unique solutions s,
Proof. From A2)-A3) and [2] , (20) and (21) admit unique solutions P > 0, Π > 0 such that
Under this initial condition, we have
We further introduce the following assumption.
I is Hurwitz, whereĀ
Proof. See Appendix B.
It is shown that the decentralized control laws (17) uniformly stabilize the systems (1) .
Theorem 2.4: Let A1)-A4) hold. Then for any N,
We now give two equivalent conditions for uniform stabilization of multiagent systems.
Theorem 2.5: Let A3) hold. Then for (PS) the following statements are equivalent:
(ii) (20) and (21) admit unique solutions P > 0, Π > 0, respectively, andĀ
Hurwitz.
(iii) A2) and A4) hold.
Proof. See the Appendix C.
For the case G = 0, we have a simplified version of Theorem 2.5.
Corollary 2.1: Assume that A3) holds and G = 0. Then for (PS) the following statements are equivalent:
(ii) (20) and (21) admit unique solutions P > 0, Π > 0, respectively.
(iii) A2) holds.
When A3) is weakened to A3 ′ ), we have the following equivalent conditions of uniform stabilization of the systems.
Theorem 2.6: Let A3 ′ ) hold. Then for (PS) the following statements are equivalent:
(ii) (20) and (21) admit unique solutions P ≥ 0, Π ≥ 0, respectively, andĀ
Proof. See the Appendix C. For the more general case that Q are only symmetric, we have the following equivalent conditions for uniform stabilization of multiagent systems.
Denote
Theorem 2.7: Assume that both M 1 and M 2 have no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis. Then for (PS) the following statements are equivalent:
(ii) (20) and (21) admit ρ-stabilizing solutions 1 , respectively, andĀ
I is Hurwitz.
(iii) A2) and A4) hold. I is Hurwitz. Then
Proof. From the definition of ρ-stabilizing solutions, A − BR −1 B T P − Then
By direct computations, neither M 1 nor M 2 has eigenvalues in imaginary axis if and only if
Note that if q > 0 (or a − ρ/2 < 0, q = 0), i.e., (a − ρ/2, √ q) is observable (detectable), then (27) holds, and if (28) holds.
For this model, the Riccati equation (20) is written as
Let ∆ = 4[(a−ρ/2) 2 +b 2 q/r]. If (27) holds then ∆ > 0, which implies (29) admits two solutions.
If q > 0 then (29) has a unique positive solution such that a − b 2 p/r − ρ/2 = − √ ∆/2 < 0.
If q = 0 and a − ρ/2 < 0 then (29) has a unique non-negative solution p = 0 such that
Assume that (27) and (28) hold. By Theorem 2.7, the system is uniformly stable if and only
Example 2.2: We further consider the model in Example 2.1 for the case that a + g = ρ/2 and γ = 1 (i.e., (28) does not hold). In this case, the Riccati equation (21) Thus,x satisfies
Assume that f is a constant. Then (30) does not admit a solution in C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R) unless
We are in a position to state the asymptotic optimality of the decentralized control.
April 17, 2019 DRAFT Theorem 2.8: Let A1)-A4) hold. For Problem (PS), the set of decentralized control laws {û 1 , · · · ,û N } given by (19) has asymptotic social optimality, i.e.,
Proof. We first prove that for u ∈ U c , J soc (u) < ∞ implies that
which further implies that
By (1) we have
which leads to for any r ∈ [0, 1],
By J soc (u) < ∞ and basic SDE estimates, we can find a constant C such that
From (33) and (34) we obtain
which together with A3) implies that
This and (32) lead to
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It follows from (35) that
From (36) and (37), we obtain that
This together with A3) implies that
which gives (31). By Theorem 2.4,
By a similar argument to the proof of Theorem 2.3 combined with Lemma 2.2, the conclusion follows.
If A3) is replaced by A3 ′ ), the decentralized control (19) still has asymptotic social optimality.
Corollary 2.2:
Assume that A1)-A2), A3 ′ ), A4) hold. The set of decentralized control laws given by (19) is asymptotically socially optimal.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we simply assume
is Hurwitz, and −(A 2 − (ρ/2)I) is Hurwitz (If necessary, we may apply a nonsingular linear transformation as in the proof of Theorem 2.6). Write
and (A 2 − (ρ/2)I, S 2 ) is observable which is due to the detectability of (A + G − (ρ/2)I,Q 1/2 ). 
III. MEAN FIELD LQ GAMES
In this section, we investigate the game problem for LQ mean field systems.
(PG). Seek a set of decentralized control laws to minimize individual cost for each agent in the system (1)-(2).
A. The finite-horizon problem
We first consider the finite-horizon problem. Suppose thatx ∈ C([0, T ], R n ) is given for approximation of x (N ) . Replacing x (N ) in (1) and (3) byx, we have the following auxiliary optimal control problem.
By examining the variation ofJ F i , we obtain the unique optimal control of (P2). Theorem 3.1:
admits a unique solution (x i , p i , q i ), and the optimal controlû i = −R −1 B T p i .
Proof. Since Q ≥ 0 and R > 0, then by [41] , (P2) is uniformly convex, and hence admits a unique optimal control. By a similar argument with Theorem 2.1, the conclusion follows.
It follows from (38) that
Letp =Px +ŝ. By Itô's formula, we obtain
This implies
Then by (38) and (39) we have
which implies that q i = P σ, and
Assume A5) Equation (40) 
where P,P andŝ are determined by (42), (40) and (41), respectively, andx andx i satisfy
Denote given by (43) is an ε-Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
Proof. See the Appendix D.
B. The infinite-horizon problem
For simplicity, we consider the case G = 0.
Based on the analysis in Section III-A, we may design the following decentralized control for (PG):û
where P andP are determined by
respectively, andŝ,x ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R n ) are determined by
andx i satisfies
Here the existence conditions of P,P , s andx need to be investigated further.
We introduce the following assumptions.
A7) (49) admits a stabilizing solution.
Lemma 3.1: Assume that M 3 has n stable eigenvalues (with negative real parts) and n unstable eigenvalues, where
where H 11 is Hurwitz and L 1 is invertible. Then A7) holds.
By pre-multiplying by [P I] on both sides, we obtain
which leads to (49). By (54), we have 
, where V 11 is invertible, and H 11 , −H 22 are Hurwitz. Then
11 is the stabilizing solution of (49). V comprises 2n independent vectors, which are called Schur vectors [24] . April 17, 2019 DRAFT Lemma 3.2: Assume that A1), A6), A7) hold. Then (50)-(51) admit a set of unique solutions
Proof. By a similar argument in the proof of Theorem 2.6, the lemma follows.
Theorem 3.3: Let A1), A6), A7) hold. For Problem (PG), the set of decentralized strategies (47) is an ε-Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
Proof. See Appendix D.
IV. COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS
In this section, we compare the proposed decentralized control laws with the feedback decentralized strategies in previous works [19] , [20] .
We first introduce a definition from [4] . 
where P is the semi-positive definite solution of (48), ands =Kx † + φ. HereK satisfies For Problem (PG), let f = 0, and G = 0. In [19] , the decentralized strategies are given by
where P is the positive definite solution of (20), s * is determined by the fixed-point equation
We now show the equivalence of the decentralized open-loop and feedback solutions to mean field games.
Proposition 4.2:
The set of decentralized control laws
which gives
By comparing this with (48)-(50), one can obtain K =P − P , and ψ =ŝ. Thus, we have Finally, we consider the 2-dimensional case of Problem (PS). Take parameters as follows: An interesting generalization is to consider mean field LQ control systems with partial measurements by using variational analysis. Also, the variational analysis may be applied to general nonlinear model to construct decentralized control laws for social control and Nash games.
To prove Theorem 2.3, we need a lemma.
Lemma A.1: Let A1) hold and Q ≥ 0. Under the control (17), we have
Proof. It follows by (18) that
April 17, 2019 DRAFT From this and (16), we have
which leads tô
By A1), one can obtain
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. We first prove that for u ∈ U c , J
which with A1) implies that
We have
By (16) and (18), we obtain that (1) and (18),
From (3), we have
(A.8)
By (12)- (14), (A.6) and Itô's formula,
From this and (A.8), we obtain
By Lemma A.1, (A.4) and (A.5), we obtain 
Thus,
Proof of Theorem 2.4. By A1)-A4), Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, we obtain thatx
which further gives that
2 dt < ∞ and
I is Hurwitz. By Schwarz's inequality,
This with (19) completes the proof.
APPENDIX C PROOFS OF THEOREMS 2.5 AND 2.6
Proof. i)⇒ ii). By (18) ,
It follows from A1) that
By comparing (23) and (C.1), we obtain E[
By (23), we havē
where h = −BR −1 B T s + f . By the arbitrariness ofx 0 with (C.2) we obtain that A + G −
Then from (26) we have
By (26) 
On the other hand, (A.2) gives
By (C.4) and the arbitrariness of x i0 , i = 1, · · · , N, we obtain thatĀ
(ii)⇒(iii). Define V (t) = e −ρtȳT (t)Πȳ(t), whereȳ satisfies
Note that V * ≥ 0. Then lim t→∞ V * (t) exists, which implies
. This with (C.5) implies
By A3), one can obtain that there exists T > 0 such that Π T (0) > 0 (See e.g. [43] , [44] I are Hurwitz, respectively. Thus, there exists a unique s(0) such that s ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R n ). It is straightforward thatx ∈ C ρ/2 ([0, ∞), R n ).
By the argument in the proof of Theorem 2.4, (i) follows.
(i)⇒(ii). The proof of this part is similar to that of (i)⇒(ii) in Theorem 2.5.
(ii)⇒(iii). Since Π ≥ 0, then there exists an orthogonal U such that
where Π 2 > 0. From (20) , [38] , the detectability of (A + G,Q 1/2 ) implies the detectability of (Ā,Q 1/2 ).
Take ζ(0) = ξ = [ξ From this and (D.2), the theorem follows.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Note that {x i (t), i = 1, · · · , N} are mutually independent processes with the expectationx(t). By Lemma 3.2,
We only need to show E where C 1 is independent of N. The rest of the proof follows by that of Theorem 3.2.
